what counts there is power-an element by whose presence or absence everything else is controlled. What this war must determine is who the owners of power are to be and how it will be used. And by that decision over vast stretches of the civilized earth the fate of our world will be decreed, the future of democracy laid bare, and those ways of life crushed or preserved which distinguish Western man from the helot or the beast.
II. CANADA'S AMERICAN PROBLEM* EDGAR McINNIS
The past four months have seen the beginning of a new and vitally important stage in Canada's world relations. With the collapse of France, the balance of power shifted its centre of gravity; and as that centre moved toward the western hemisphere, the . essential place of Canada in the international structure became subject to a scrutiny more intense than it has hitherto undergone. The result . has been illuminating, not only for outsiders, but for Canadians themselves. And among the things we have been forced to recognize is the multiplicity of loyalties to which we are inescapably committed by our position and by our past.
The result of the most recent developments, implicit in the Ogdensburg agreement on defence, is that we may have to accept the realization that we have obligations toward the United States.
It is true that these obligations are mutual. Mr J oh11 MacCormac* has described Canada as "America's problem," but he would readily admit that Canada has a major problem on her own hands in her relations with the United States. This is something which the American public is slowly beginning to realize. It is something which Canadians have known for a long time, but whose implications they have often been extremely reluctant ' to accept. But these are growing steadily more difficult to evade as the destinies of Britain and the United States become more inextricable, and as Canada must face the task of reconciling the views and interests of these two great nations with those of each other and of herself.
This may easily impose itself as our most important task for a generation to come. It is a task implicit not only in our history and our geography, but in the fact of our relative size. We are engaged in learning once again, by bitter example, that ancient historical fact-the unhappy lot of small nations in a lawless and predatory world. But their sin consists not so much in being small as in failing to recognize the necessary implications of that fact. A weak state cannot survive by itself. Its only hope is in union with others whose interests it shares, For Canada, these others are pre-eminently Britain and the United States, and both are essential to our tranquillity. They are no longer alternatives as they seemed to be during the past century, when we were urged to cleave to the one and despise the other. They are moving toward a partnership in world affairs, and to a share in that partnership we are inevitably committed.
The necessity has become more pressing as the United States has awakened to the fact that Canada's actions may seriously affect her own policy. The success of Mr MacCormac's book is itself an indication of a growing realization that, in his own words, "Canada, for the United States, has become the most important foreign country in the world." Some of the reasons for this he discusses in his earlier chapters; 'the remainder of the book is intended to explain to Americans the structure and outlook of the Canadian nation. Since it was written, new developments have accentuated the need for understanding on both sides, and for a clear definition of the future policies which each country will adopt to meet the new necessities revealed by the war.
From the American side, Mr MacCormac sums up the problem in a sentence: "Canada, so long as she fights in European wars and enjoys the protection of the Monroe Doctrine, makes isolation impossible for the United States," It is fortunately possible to accept this truism without drawing from it such conclusions as those of Colonel Lindbergh. But it would be wise for Canadians to recognize that, under certain circumstances, those conclusions might well take on a specious plausibility. It is perhaps fortunate for us that Colonel Lindbergh is both naIve and sincere. A clever and unscrupulous propagandist could make out a telling case which, however false fundamentally, would have a very profound effect on those sections of American opinion which are unready to recognize that the ancient traditions of American policy have to be adapted to meet entirely new conditions in world affairs.
One of our great problems is to prevent such a situation from developing. The United States has become aware of the impossibility of remaining indifferent to what happens to Canada, and of the fact that in the last resort America must act to prevent a foreign conquest of this country. Inevitably, that realization of responsibility has been accompanied by a real concern over the sort of policies that Canada may choose to pursue in future. The United States could not contemplate unmoved the adoption by Canada of a course of action which might endanger American security. At the moment there is every desire to respect Canada's complete independence. But if that independence were used in a way that endangered the safety of the United States, it would inevitably come to be regarded as a menace which must ultimately be removed.
There, whether we like it or not, is the ultimate limitation on our freedom to choose any course of policy which we may desire., It is not, however, a very grave limitation in practice. Our interests and outlook are so close to those of the United States, and so alien to those of any conceivable enemy of America, that it is hard to imagine any circumstances which would .lead us to range ourselves on the side of such an enemy. But since the choice is in fact inevitable, it is of the utmost'importance, not only that we should recognize this fact, but that we should remove from American minds all doubt about our acceptance of it, and that the acceptance should not be passive and grudging, but implemented by a positive policy. It is by such a policy that we can best convil~ce our neighbours that our continued independence is an asset rather than a potential danger. Our best way to avoid being looked on as a subordinate is to prove our right to be treated as a partner and an equal.
What many Canadians are reluctant to recognize is that this implies a more positive policy, not only toward Washington, but toward London as well. Their reluctance is based on a curious subconscious conviction that independence of policy means not merely disloyalty but potential if not actual hostility. Nothing, of course, could be farther from the truth. The adoption of an active and ,constructive policy by Ottawa, far from being a disadvantage to Great Britain, might easily be a welcome and heartening source of support in the difficult years which lie ahead.
, We have long had the opportunity to adopt such a policy. It has not been entirely Britain's fault if we have failed to extend our theoretical equality of status to practical equality of stature. The' re has) of course, been the excuse of a real dispari ty in size and resources and experience. But it has not been enough to justify our tepid and negative attitude in the past; it will be distinctly less so in future; and we are already facing the prospect that we shall soon have thrust upon us the responsibility for a positive and constructive role, not only in the affairs of the Commonwealth, but in the relations of the Commonwealth with the rest of the world.
For the time has come when our lingering colonial dependence on Britain is no longer possible to maintain. Britain herself is unable to support it. When the war ends, she may still find herself strong in relation to a ravaged Europe, but her power will be relatively weaker as against the remaining World Powers. She will no longer be able to assume those world-wide responsibilities of political and military protection which she accepted in a previous age. The nations of the Commonwealth will be compelled, by Britain's necessity no less than by their own, to justify their claim to nationhood by taking their destinies in their own hands and pursuing them by virtue of their own strength and abilities.
What that does not mean is a repudiation of the mother country. Britain, more tha.n ever, will have need of the New World to redress the balance of the Old. Here is a process in which Canada has a major role marked out for her by nature. But if she 1s to fulfil that role, she will have to adopt a very different attitude from that of the past quarter of a century. She will have to act like an adult nation. And the key to success or failure will once more be her relations with the United States. A grudging and passive attitude will not serve. She must win from Washington a respect for her independence based on a realization that, while Canada's policies are firmly gounded on the fullest co-operation with the United States, they are her own policies springing from her own initiative and based on a clear and reasoned conviction of where her own interests lie. A nation which attains that position can hope to be listened to with respect when it seeks to harmonize the views of two greater partners who, for all their greatness, are prepared to recognize that the lesser nation is none the less a partner with them.
That is the sort of responsibility that faces us during the years to come. It is a problem thrust upon us by the political no less than the geographical position which we occupy. It is a position whose fortunate character is in many ways unique. We stand in a relation to two great powers which has enabled us to combine protection with freedom in a way which no other nation of our size has enjoyed during the present century. But there is a pnce, though an extremely light pric' e, for all this. We cannot hope to occupy half a continent without deciding the nature of our relations with the other half. We cannot possess vital coast-lines fronting on two oceans without recognizing that our neighbour-to whom, whether we admit it or not, we ldok for protection in case of attack -has also an interest in se'eing that no other state is provoked by our actions into an attempt to seize those positions. We cannot reasonably expect to share the fruits of the co-operation of the two great English-speaking democracies without being prepared to make a positive contribution to that co-operation. We must evolve our own policy and pursue it on our own initiative; for it is a true paradox in this case that the more mature and independen t we become, the more likely we are to contribute to the effective uni ty of the Anglo-Saxon world.
III. THE EMPIRE AND WORLD ORDER
A. BRADY The present war is bringing forth books and pamphlets which attempt to assess anew the relation of the British Empire to world society.* Of these the best informed and most challenging volume so far comes from the United States! In Great Britain: An Empire in Transition, Albert Viton surveys the modern life of the Empire, its strength, weaknesses, and perplexing problems. While his general attitude is one of sympathy and admiration, he is not restrained from trenchant criticism, some of which is merited and some grossly extravagant. There is a journalist's lack of reserve in his forthright pronouncements, but the sober facts of his analysis (his command of fact is on the whole impressive) do not always support the trenchancy of his leading sentences. He remarks, for example, that the reason why "this gigantic Empire has not been able to assure world peace by its own power is due only to the hopeless mental astigmatism and muddle-headednes~ of its rulers. Until the last few years, certainly, Great Britain had the resources and influence to crush potential disturbers of world peace by 
